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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the : 
Discipline of: 
PETER ENNENGA, #0999 : Case No. 20000476-SC 
RESPONDENT. : Priority No. 5 
REPLY AND CROSS APPEAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS 
APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Constitution Article VIII, Section 4: Utah Code §78-2-2-(3)(c). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
WHETHER THE COURT IMPOSED THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF DISCIPLINE 
AND WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING RESPONDENT'S EX 
POST FACTO CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT. 
The standard of review on the issue of whether the appropriate level of 
discipline has been imposed is the "clearly erroneous standard". The Appellate Court 
is permitted to draw its own inferences from the trial court's factual determinations 
which are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. While serious 
considerations are to be given to the rulings and factual findings of the disciplinary 
court, the appellate court may make an independent judgment regarding the 
appropriate level of discipline if the evidence warrants. See In Re Pendleton, 2000 
UT 77,1J20. Citing In Re Stubbs 974 P.2d 296 (Utah 1999) and In Re Knowlton 800 
P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1990). The standard of review on the cross appeal issue 
regarding Mr. Ennenga's ex post facto claim is one of "correctness." The appellate 
court decides the matter without any deference to the trial judge's determination of 
law. State v. Maauire 975 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Mr. Ennenga's constitutional ex post facto argument was preserved in the trial 
court by his having filed a Memorandum Regarding Sanctions and through closing 
argument. (R342-363). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
The following Rules contained in the Standards for Imposing Lawyers' 
Sanctions will need to be reviewed as part of the considerations in this appeal. The 
relevant Rules are: 
Rule 3. Factors to be considered in imposing sanctions. 
3.1. Generally. 
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanctions after a 
finding of lawyer misconduct; 
(a) the duty violated; 
(b) the lawyer's mental state; 
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; 
and, 
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
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Rule 4. Imposition of Sanctions. 
4.1. Generally. 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the 
factors set out in Standard 3.1, the following sanctions are generally appropriate. 
4.2. Disbarment. 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
a. knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a),(d), (e) or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the 
lawyer or another or to deceive the Court, and causes serious or potentially serious 
injury to a party, the public or the legal system or causes serious or potentially 
serious interference with a legal proceeding; or 
b. engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which 
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, 
misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation or theft; or the sale, distribution, 
or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an 
attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or 
c. engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law. 
4.3 Suspension. 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
a. knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), 
(d), (e) or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential 
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or potential 
interference with a legal proceeding; or 
b. engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in 
Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness 
to practice law. 
4.4 Reprimand. 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
a. negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e) or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or 
potential injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or 
potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
b. engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 
3 
practice law. 
4.5 Admonition. 
Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
a. negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e) or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little or no 
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or interference with a legal 
proceeding, but exposes a party, the public, or the legal system to potential injury or 
causes potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
b. engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in 
this Standard 4 that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
Rule 6. Aggravation and Mitigation. 
6.1. Generally. 
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances may be considered and weighted in deciding what sanctions to 
impose. 
6.2 Aggravating circumstances. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify 
an increase in the degree of discipline to the imposed. Aggravating circumstances 
may include: 
a. Prior record of discipline; 
b. Dishonest or selfish motive; 
c. A pattern of misconduct; 
d. Multiple offenses; 
e. Obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing 
to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority; 
f. submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary process; 
g. refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct 
involved either to the client or to the disciplinary authority; 
h. vulnerability of victim; 
i. substantial experience in the practice of law; 
j . lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; and 
k. illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. 
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6.3 Mitigating circumstances. 
Mitigating circumstances are any consideration or factors that may justify a 
reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. Mitigating circumstances may 
include: 
a. absence of a prior record of discipline; 
b. absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
c. personal or emotional problems; 
d. timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; 
e. full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority 
prior to the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 
f. inexperience in the practice of law; 
g. good character or reputation; 
h. physical disability; 
i. mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when; 
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental 
disability; and, 
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally 
contributed to the misconduct; and, 
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or 
mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful 
rehabilitation; and, 
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence 
of that misconduct is unlikely; 
j . unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the 
respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that the 
respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay; 
k. interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or 
impairment; 
I. imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
m. remorse; and 
n. remoteness of prior offenses. 
6.4 Factors which are neither aggravating nor mitigating. 
The following circumstances should not be considered as either aggravating 
or mitigation: 
a. forced or compelled restitution; 
b. withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer; 
c. resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings; 
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d. complainant's recommendation as to sanctions; and 
e. failure of injured client to complain. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is a case involving attorney discipline. The Office of Professional 
Conduct has appealed the trial court's suspension of attorney Peter M. Ennenga, 
claiming that the appropriate level of discipline should have been disbarment. The 
respondent has filed a cross appeal claiming that the trial court erred in failing to 
consider his constitutional ex post facto argument relative to the appropriate level 
of discipline. 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
The Office of Professional Conduct filed its initial complaint against Mr. 
Ennenga on August 1997. (R1-68). An amended complaint was filed September 12, 
1997. (R145-165). Mr. Ennenga filed timely answers to both. (R69-72 & R166-
170). 
On August 7,1998, the Office of Professional Conduct filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment with supporting memorandum. (R172-186). Mr. Ennenga filed 
his memorandum in opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment on 
August 20, 1998. (R189-192) 
On September 18, 1998, the Court entered its minute entry granting partial 
summary judgment as to counts 4, 5, 8 & 13 but denying summary judgment on the 
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balance of the counts. (R208). 
On November 9, 1998, the Office of Professional Conduct filed its formal 
Order relative to the Court's minute entry. (R214-215). Mr. Ennenga filed an 
objection to that Order on the grounds that the reason for the Court's denial on some 
of the counts had equal applicability on some of the counts to which summary 
judgment had been granted. (R212-213), 
It was not until October 26,1999 that the objections as to the partial summary 
judgment order were resolved and an amended order was entered by the Office of 
Professional Conduct. (R268-269). Summary Judgment was only granted on Courts 
8 and 13. 
The trial on the factual allegations was held January 11, 2000 following which 
the Court entered a Memorandum Decision dated January 18, 2000 issuing Findings 
of Fact and concluding that Mr. Ennenga had violated certain rules of professional 
conduct. (R309-314). 
A sanctions hearing was conducted on March 28, 2000. At the sanctions 
hearing, Mr. Ennenga filed his Memorandum Regarding Sanctions which, among 
other things, asserted that his discipline should be viewed by the standard of 
discipline that was in place and utilized at the time of his misconduct as opposed to 
standards which were adopted subsequent to his misconduct. 
III. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT. 
On April 3, 2000, the Court issued is memorandum decision relative to the 
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sanctions and suspended Mr. Ennenga from the practice of law for a period of six 
months. As a part of those Findings and Conclusions, the Court concluded that Mr. 
Ennenga's ex post facto argument was contrary to case law and not persuasive. 
(R365-375). 
Formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared by the Office 
of Professional Conduct. (R376-382). The Office of Professional Conduct then filed 
this appeal objecting to the level of discipline imposed and Mr. Ennenga filed his 
cross appeal objecting to the Court's failure to consider his constitutional ex post 
facto argument. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The First Amended Complaint filed by the Office of Professional Conduct on 
September 12,1997 made factual allegations on four different matters. (R145-165). 
(THE WILSON MATTER) 
It was alleged that in the spring of 1991, JoAnn Wilson retained Mr. Ennenga 
to collect various overdue accounts for her. On or about May 26,1992, Ms. Wilson 
executed a release and received the sum of $18,000.00 which she requested that 
Mr. Ennenga hold in trust. Ms. Wilson did not file an informal complaint with the 
Office of Professional Conduct until May 30, 1996. The notice of that informal 
complaint was not sent to Mr. Ennenga until October 29,1996. A screening panel 
heard the Wilson matter on January 30,1997 and voted to issue a formal complaint. 
8 
(THE YARBIL MATTER) 
Tanner Yarbil alleged that he retained Mr. Ennenga on or about June 3, 1993 
on a contingency fee basis to represent him in a civil action against Logan 
Manufacturing company. An informal complaint was not filed by Tanner Yarbil until 
April 13,1995. The notice of that informal complaint was not sent to Mr. Ennenga 
until October 11, 1995. A screening panel heard the Yarbil matter on February 6, 
1996 and voted to issue a formal complaint. 
(THE DURRANT-FUNK MATTER) 
Although summary judgment was granted as to Count 13 of the Bar's First 
Amended Complaint (R268), an allegation that Mr. Ennenga failed to respond to the 
Bar's request for information on this matter, the substantive allegations were 
dismissed by the Office of Professional Conduct at the beginning of the trial and 
should be of no further relevance. (R306). 
(THE GLOVER MATTER) 
The trial court concluded that this matter was time barred by the statute of 
limitations. (R313). 
(COURT PROCEEDINGS) 
On August 7, 1998, approximately one year after the formal Complaint was 
filed, the Office of Professional Conduct filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment with supporting memorandum. (R172-186). On that same day, the Office 
of Professional Conduct filed Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
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Documents or Things. (R187-188). 
On August 20,1998, Mr. Ennenga filed his Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R189-192) 
On August 25,1998, the Office of Professional Conduct filed its reply. (R193-
201). 
On September 9,1998, the Office of Professional Conduct filed its notice to 
submit for decision. (R202-204). 
On September 18, 1998, the Court entered its minute entry granting partial 
summary judgment as to counts 4, 5, 8 & 13 but denying summary judgment on the 
balance of the counts. (R208). 
On November 9,1998, the Office of Professional Conduct prepared and filed 
its formal order relative to the Court's minute entry. (R214-215). Mr. Ennenga filed 
an objection to that order on the grounds that the reason for denial on some of the 
counts had equal applicability on some of the counts to which summary judgment 
had been granted. (R212-213). 
It was not until October 26,1999 that the objections as to the partial summary 
judgment order were resolved and an amended order was entered by the Office of 
Professional Conduct. (R268-269). Summary Judgment was only granted on Courts 
8 and 13. 
While it is true that Mr. Ennenga did not answer the discovery requests until 
March 23,1999, (R245), the Office of Professional Conduct was not prejudiced by 
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that delay since the Summary Judgment dispute had still not been resolved. Mr. 
Ennenga's delay did not materially contribute to the overall delay of these 
proceedings. 
A trial on the factual allegations was held on January 11, 2000 following which 
the Court entered a memorandum decision dated January 18, 2000 with Findings of 
Fact and concluding that Mr. Ennenga had violated rules of professional conduct. 
(R309-314). 
The allegations in OPC's First Amended Complaint relative to the Durrant-
Funk matter, were dismissed by the Court at the beginning of the trial since the Bar 
announced its intention not to pursue those allegations. (R306). The allegations 
regarding the Rodney Glover matter, were dismissed by the Court as being barred 
by the statute of limitations. (R313). 
The trial court found that Mr. Ennenga failed to timely respond to the OPC's 
request for information on the Wilson, Yarbil and Glover complaints, and had earlier 
entered summary judgment on Mr. Ennenga's failure to timely respond to the OPC's 
request for information on the Durrant-Funk complaint. The Court further found that 
Mr. Ennenga failed to inform Tanner Yarbil that he was no longer going to pursue the 
matter that Mr. Yarbil had retained him to pursue1. The real issue in this appeal over 
'It is a little unclear how the trial court made its findings relative to the Tanner Yarbil 
complaint since Tanner Yarbil did not testify at the trial. Since it is doubtful that the Bar would 
be pursuing Mr. Ennenga's disbarment based upon the Tanner Yarbil allegations, Mr. 
Ennenga has chosen not to appeal the Court's findings relative to this Count. 
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the appropriate level of discipline is premised only upon the Mary Wilson complaint. 
Absent the Mary Wilson findings, disbarment would not be a discipline available for 
consideration. 
Focusing then on the JoAnn Wilson allegations, the trial court entered these 
specific Findings of Fact. 
"2. In approximately the spring of 1991 JoAnn Wilson retained the 
respondent to collect various amounts owed her, including a sum in the approximate 
amount of $18,000 owed to her business from Thomas E. Soderberg. 
3. Respondent collected $18,000 from Thomas E. Soderberg on or about 
May 21, 1992. 
4. On approximately May 26,1992, Wilson requested that Ennenga hold 
the $18,000 in an interest-bearing escrow account. 
5. Respondent never deposited said money in any trust or escrow account, 
but in October of 1992 deposited a portion of Wilson's money into his personal 
checking account, retaining the balance in the form of a cashier's check. 
6. Respondent spent all of Wilson's money for personal purposes. 
7. In April, 1993, Wilson's accountant requested an accounting of the 
money from respondent, and respondent failed to provide it. 
8. Wilson made several attempts to contact respondent regarding her 
money and respondent either failed to respond or promised payment, which he failed 
to do. 
9. Wilson filed an informal Complaint against respondent with the OPC on 
May 30,1996. 
10. Respondent did not pay Wilson her money until June of 1997. 
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11. Respondent used his position as Wilson's attorney and fiduciary to 
obtain possession of Wilson's money. 
12. Respondent breached his fiduciary duty and converted Wilson's funds 
for his own use without her permission or knowledge." 
The matter then proceeded to a sanctions hearing which was held March 28, 
2000. Thereafter, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision suspending Mr. 
Ennenga from the practice of law for a period of six months. (R365-374). 
The Court's Memorandum Decision regarding the sanction to be imposed 
considered each of the factors anticipated by the Rules. 
Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, after a 
Court has entered a finding of lawyer misconduct, these factors are to be considered 
in imposing sanctions: 
a. The duty violated; 
b. The lawyer's mental state; 
c. The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and, 
d. The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
A. THE DUTY VIOLATED 
The duties of lawyers are specifically stated in the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Any violation of a rule will be considered as a lawyer having violated a 
duty. In this case, the Court found Mr. Ennenga violated his duty to provide the OPC 
with information, failed to communicate with Tanner Yarbil and breached his 
fiduciary duty to Mary Wilson. 
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B. THE LAWYER'S MENTAL STATE 
With respect to Mr. Ennenga's mental state, the Court found that: 
"The reason that Mr. Ennenga misappropriated Ms. Wilson's 
money was that he had a history of poor business practices in 
connection with his law practice which resulted in his personal 
financial situation being such that he could not make his 
mortgage payments when due. This objective financial situation 
was coupled with Mr. Ennenga's subjective inability to inform his 
wife and children that he was not meeting his financial 
obligations. Mr. Ennenga knew that Ms. Wilson was not going to 
require immediate payment of her funds to her, and he stalled 
her when she started requesting the fund by avoiding discussion 
of the fund's whereabouts or the specific time that he would remit 
them to her. Mr. Ennenga testified that he didn't want to lie to 
Ms. Wilson, but he didn't want to admit that he had taken the 
funds and no longer had them either. He further testified that he 
had many thousands of dollars outstanding in the form of 
accounts receivable and from the time that he took the $18,000 
he believed he would be able to replace it with interest and pay 
Ms. Wilson her funds when she required them." 
C. THE POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL INJURY CAUSED 
BY THE LAWYER'S MISCONDUCT 
The Court found that since Tanner Yarbil did not testify, no evidence was 
present to show that he suffered any actual injury. 
With respect to JoAnn Wilson, the evidence presented showed that after Mary 
Wilson filed her informal complaint with the OPC in May 1996 but before the Bar 
filed its first formal Complaint in August 1997, Bar counsel, Kate Toomey, was 
advised by Mary Wilson's lawyer by letter dated July 2,1997, that Mr. Ennenga had 
repaid her the $18,000 without the necessity of a law suit having been filed. 
Additionally, he paid her an amount that exceeded what she could have been 
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expected to collect with a judgment rate of interest plus all attorney fees that she 
incurred to get the amount collected. (Respondent's Exhibit 1 - JoAnn Wilson 
testimony T12-14). Accordingly, the Court found no injury. 
P. THE EXISTENCE OF AGGRAVATING OR MITIGATING FACTORS 
These factors as found by the Court are discussed in greater detail below. 
The Court then concluded that absent aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances, Rule 4 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions would, under 
the facts of this case, involve a presumptive sanction of disbarment. 
The Court then went to the "next step in the analysis" and considered the 
existence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances listed in Rule 6. 
Rule 6 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions provides that the Court 
should weigh any aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deciding which 
sanction to impose. 
With respect to the aggravating circumstances listed in Rule 6.2, the Court 
found as follows: 
"(a). Prior record of discipline. There was prior discipline, but not of the 
same nature as the Wilson misconduct."2 
2lt should be noted that the OPC had no knowledge of any prior discipline 
regarding Mr. Ennenga. The Sanctions Hearing Brief given to the Court by the Bar at 
the start of the sanctions hearing, specifically stated that Mr. Ennenga had no prior 
discipline. This would have been a mitigating factor. Mr. Ennenga volunteered in his 
sanctions hearing testimony that he had received two reprimands in the late 1980's in 
connection with failing to file pleadings. (Sanctions Hearing P-16). 
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"(b). Dishonest or selfish motive. Mr. Ennenga's act was to benefit himself 
and his family. 
(c). A pattern of misconduct. The Court does not find a pattern of 
misconduct in this matter, excepting his reluctance to participate in the disciplinary 
process against him. 
(d). Multiple offenses. While consideration of the rules violated would seem 
to indicate multiple offenses, it is the trial court's perspective that there were minor 
offenses and one stand-alone serious offense, namely, the Wilson matter. 
(e). Obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to 
comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority. Mr. Ennenga admits this. 
(f). Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary process. This has apparently not occurred. 
(g). Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, 
either to the client or to the disciplinary authority. Mr. Ennenga has admitted the 
wrongful nature of the misconduct, has explained his involvement completely, and 
expresses sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the misconduct took 
place. He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until shortly before the 
trial. 
(h). Vulnerability of victim. Neither Mr. Yarbil nor Ms. Wilson were 
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particularly vulnerable. Mr. Wilson, in fact, made the misconduct too easy. 
(i). Substantial experience in the practice of law. Mr. Ennenga has 
practiced law for some 30 years, but it was only 21 years to the date of the 
misappropriation of funds. 
Q). Lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga has made full restitution, 
but did not do so until he was under duress. 
(k). Illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. The only 
illegal conduct that occurred here was the misappropriation of funds." 
The Court then considered the mitigating factors of Rule 6.3 and found: 
"(a) Absence of a prior record of discipline. As stated above, there is a prior 
record of discipline, but less significant than 8.4 and not of the same sort of 
misconduct. 
(b) Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. Not the case here. 
(c) Personal or emotional problems. Mr. Ennenga was suffering personal 
and emotional problems as a result of his inability to meet his regular financial 
obligations. 
(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga's effort was not particularly 
timely, but he did completely rectify the consequences to Ms. Wilson. 
(e) Full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to 
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the discovery of any misconduct, or cooperative attitude toward proceedings. This 
did not occur. 
(f) Inexperience in the practice of the law. Not applicable. 
(g) Good character or reputation. Two attorneys in good standing and two 
clients of Mr. Ennenga's testified that they believed despite the facts of the instant 
case, that Mr. Ennenga was a fine attorney with an outstanding reputation for 
honesty. 
(h) Physical disability. Not applicable. 
(i) Mental disability or impairment. Not applicable. 
0) Unreasonable delay in the disciplinary proceedings provided that Mr. 
Ennenga did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that Mr. 
Ennenga has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay. There was a 
significant delay in this matter. While Ms. Wilson did not file her complaint against 
the respondent until 1996, other complaints with respect to other matters referred to 
above were filed in 1993. The OPC has been conducting an investigation into this 
matter since 1993, and only filed its Complaint in August of 1997, and its First 
Amended Complaint in September of 1997. Mr. Ennenga certainly didn't facilitate 
moving the case forward on a faster track in his refusal to provide information to the 
Bar through the discovery process, but the delay is attributable as much or more to 
the OPC as it is to Ennenga. Mr. Ennenga has not demonstrated prejudice resulting 
from the delay. 
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(k) Interim reform. Mr. Ennenga has not had any valid complaints filed 
against him regarding misconduct after 1992. 
(I) Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. The Court is aware of no 
other penalties or sanctions Mr. Ennenga has suffered. 
(m) Remorse. As stated above, Mr. Ennenga is very remorseful and has 
been since the 1992 misconduct. 
(n) Remoteness of prior offenses. Prior offenses are not particularly 
significant, but are also not particularly remote in time." 
The Court then concluded from this analysis that the mitigating circumstances 
outweighed the aggravating circumstances. The Bar has appealed this conclusion 
claiming that the trial judge should have disbarred Mr. Ennenga rather than impose 
the six month suspension.3 
At the sanctions hearing, Mr. Ennenga filed his memorandum regarding 
sanctions which, among other things, asserted that his discipline should be viewed 
by the standards of discipline that were in place and being utilized at the time of his 
misconduct as opposed to standards that were adopted subsequent to his 
misconduct. The Court found that this argument was contrary to case law and not 
3The Order of Suspension signed by Judge Henroid was dated May 1, 2000. 
Pursuant to Rule 26 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, that Order of 
Suspension became effective on June 1, 2000 and would therefore end on December 
1, 2000. By the time this appeal is decided, Mr. Ennenga will have served his six 
month suspension period and will be entitled to reinstatement pursuant to the 
conditions of Rule 24 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
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persuasive. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly evaluated and applied the Rule 3 factors to be 
considered in imposing a sanction and the Rule 6 factors in aggravation and 
mitigation. More importantly, if the standards of discipline actually being utilized 
when Mr. Ennenga's misconduct occurred, were applied to his case, the level of 
discipline may well have been less severe. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
WHETHER THE COURT IMPOSED THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF DISCIPLINE. 
The Bar argues that the trial court gave undue weight to factors that were not 
particularly compelling. The Bar claims that "recent case law" compels a conclusion 
of disbarment. The Bar overlooks the fact that the Court reviewed each of those 
"recent" cases, and concluded that weighing the misconduct of Mr. Ennenga against 
the misconduct of the attorneys in the prior cases, "shows a significant difference in 
the seriousness of the conduct, both as to the number of incidents, the motive of the 
attorney, and the time elapsed between misconduct and sanction." (Memorandum 
Decision on Sanctions. P-9). This evaluation of relative severity of conduct was 
appropriate, correct and anticipated by the "recent case law" referenced by the Bar. 
The Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
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were adopted by the Supreme Court by minute entry in May 1993 and became 
effective July 1,1993. The first case decided by the Utah Supreme Court following 
the adoption of those new Rules was In Re Babilis 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). Since 
this was the first reported attorney discipline case handled under the new Rules, it 
was this Court's first application of Rule 4 and first consideration of the weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors under Rule 6. In Babilis. the Court concluded as 
a matter of future principle, the general rule would be that "intentional 
misappropriation of client funds will result in disbarment unless the lawyer can 
demonstrate truly compelling mitigating circumstances." 
Indeed, there have been four Utah Supreme Court published discipline cases 
including Babilis, since the utilization of the new Standards and Rules.4 In each 
case, the trial judge imposed a discipline less serious than disbarment and in each 
case, the Supreme Court reversed and concluded that the appropriate discipline was 
disbarment. 
In addition to Babilis. those cases are: 
In Re Ince 957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998); 
In Re Tanner 960 P.2d 399 (Utah 1998); and, 
In Re Stubbs 974 P.2d 296 (Utah 1999) 
It was these four cases that the trial court specifically noted when comparing 
4A fifth case, In Re Pendleton, 2000 UT 77, was recently issued but is not helpful 
here since it was a case dealing with a lawyer's criminal conviction and distribution of 
drugs. 
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the relative misconduct of Mr. Ennenga. As noted by the Court, the attorney 
misconduct in each of these cases, was more egregious than Mr. Ennenga's 
misconduct. 
In Babilis, the Court found that Babilis took $78,659.43 from his client's estate 
without authorization, intentionally failed to account for assets of the estate, billed the 
estate for non existent and over charged expenses in the sum of $14,122.00 when 
there were only documented expenses of $775.00 and had set up a practice in his 
office where he routinely over billed clients. The conduct of Mr. Ennenga, while 
falling under the same violation of duty as occurred with Mr. Babilis, was 
considerably less severe, not repeated and not enhanced by other similar 
misconduct as found in Babilis. In Babilis, the Court said that the difference between 
sanctions of disbarment and suspension lies in the relative severity of the conduct, 
at 212. 
In Ince. his misconduct included forged warranty deeds and quit claim deeds 
and misrepresentations to a bank for the use of pension funds; a long series of 
actions involving misappropriations of funds belonging to his law firm of Callister, 
Duncan and Nebeker; forging endorsements on checks; failing to deposit client funds 
into trust accounts and generally engaging in a long series of transactions involving 
false documents, false explanations and criminal misrepresentations. 
In Tanner, the client hired Tanner to represent him in an attempt to recover 
$100,000 from Emery County authorities that had been seized from him. Tanner 
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agreed to accept a settlement of one-tenth of the seized amount without his client's 
permission. Tanner forged and back dated a special power of attorney. He had his 
wife, a notary, notarize the document with an expired seal to lend authenticity. He 
used the forged document to obtain the funds from the United States Attorney's 
office and then subsequently informed his client that he intended to retain the entire 
amount as his fee. Tanner subsequently lied to the FBI about the date and 
preparation of the power of attorney and was charged criminally in Federal Court. 
Tanner plead guilty to a felony. 
Stubbs involved the attorney's participation in a scheme to defraud the State. 
He was charged with and plead guilty to a count of communications fraud and 
subsequently lied to the Bar when attempting to explain his criminal conduct. 
Stubbs' misconduct in this scheme involving the misrepresentations made to the 
State as well as the Bar and occurred over a long period of time beginning in 1988 
and continuing through 1996. 
Each of these cases involved prolonged activities and repeated instances of 
misconduct and are clearly distinguishable from and more serious than the 
misconduct attributed to Mr. Ennenga. 
The Bar complains that the trial court "identified as mitigating circumstances 
several factors that either do not meet the criteria set forth in the standards or are 
inconsistent with the Court's guidance as to how they should be weighed." (Page 12 
Appellant's Brief). 
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How does a trial court or for that matter, an appellate court decide that there 
are "truly compelling mitigating circumstances?" 
This Court attempted to answer that question in In Re Ince, supra: 
"Because Rule 6 does not provide any guidance as to how 
these circumstances are to be weighed, the process of 
applying them is necessarily somewhat subjective. 
However, one of the concerns that prompted the adoption 
of the present Standards was that under the prior 
disciplinary regime, there was no detailed set of guidelines 
that defined the sanction generally appropriate for a given 
type of misconduct. Thus, discipline under the old regime 
had something of an ad hoc quality, and there was the 
possibility, of not the probability, that similarly situated 
individuals might not receive similar sanctions, (citing 
Babilis). Although the new Standards are intended to 
preserve a measure of flexibility in assigning sanctions, 
the whole basis for their adoption was to avoid the 
uncertainty that existed under the old rules. Therefore, we 
offer the following guidance as to the application of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances under Rule 6. 
To justify a departure from the presumptive level of 
discipline set forth in the Standards, the aggravating and 
mitigating factors must be significant", at 1237. 
This Court went on then to examine the specific claims of mitigation asserted 
in Ince and found them to lack compelling significance. If Mr. Ennenga's misconduct 
were truly in the context of "similarly situated individuals," then a detailed 
examination of his mitigating factors would show that Mr. Ennenga was and is not 
"similarly situated" to Babilis, Ince, Tanner or Stubbs. 
True, he did misuse a client's funds, but this was single incident with a single 
client. It occurred in 1992 after Mr. Ennenga had practiced law for 21 years without 
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any similar incident or complaint of dishonestly. Mary Wilson did not file her 
complaint until May of 1996, approximately four years after the misconduct. The 
formal Bar proceedings were not initiated until August of 1997 and not concluded 
until early this year. While Mr. Ennenga has not demonstrated any prejudice by that 
delay, he has demonstrated that during the next eight years following his breach of 
Mary Wilson's trust, he has not engaged in any similar misconduct. 
Mr. Ennenga provided evidence that he has a good reputation with his peers 
and clients. Although those who testified acknowledged disappointment upon 
learning of Mr. Ennenga's misconduct, they expressed a willingness and ability to 
trust him in the future. 
Hopefully, Mr. Ennenga's own explanation as to why this happened will 
provide this Court with a better understanding as to why the trial court felt there were 
compelling mitigating circumstances. 
"BY MR. FLORENCE: 
Q: Pretty nice things said about you, Mr. Ennenga. 
Now, would you care to explain why this conduct 
happened? 
A. It's complicated, and I have a difficult time 
understanding it myself. I've made mistakes. Sometimes 
they are cumulative. Maybe it was a mistake to decide to 
become a proprietor back in 77 when I did so. Maybe it 
was a mistake to think that some of the problems that I 
encountered as a proprietor were going to be resolved by 
belonging to a small firm. I constantly had times when I 
wouldn't do the right business thing. I wouldn't bill people 
for the work that I did and generate the money that I 
needed to support my family the way I thought they 
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wanted to be supported. The billing problems didn't go 
away when I got structure through the firm. It almost 
became worse in that when I would have to be the focus 
of attention at a weekly meeting, that I'd retract from that. 
And sometimes I think that when faced with a tough 
personal issue, I am reluctant to hit it head on. I know that 
I have been unwilling to ever<go to my family and say that 
I have this or that financial difficulty. And I've had some. 
And that's what I was facing in 1992. I had created a 
situation through my business practices where my house 
was in foreclosure. Through - through earlier financial 
mistakes, whether it be the billing practices or choosing 
the wrong clients, I mean, I had people that owed me tons 
of money to whom I had sent bills, but were in no position 
to pay. Whatever the situation, I was a short while from 
having my house sold. I was not in the initial stages of 
foreclosure, I was in the latter stages of foreclosure. I was 
even beyond the time when my lender had to accept the 
delinquency. I - I did not tell my family about this. They 
did not know. That is a part of my difficult history. I 
usually don't tell. It's not easy for me to confront a 
personal weakness, especially to disclose it to my family. 
And I did something I've never done before. I had 
received a check for JoAnn Wilson that was payable to me 
as her attorney, and I used it. I used it, and I fixed the 
problem. Now, to say that I used it and that I was going to 
turn around and replace it and nobody would be the wiser 
doesn't change the act that I misused it. But, in all 
honesty, that was what I was thinking, "Nobody would be 
hurt and my problem would be resolved," Now, that's not -
I'm not rationalizing it and I am not justifying it, I am just 
trying to explain it. I have tried hard throughout these 
proceedings, from the moment that I was confronted with 
this, not to try - or not to -not justify what I've done or 
pass blame. It's - it's my fault. Now, to say that I didn't 
admit it until confronted is true. But these are not easy 
things to confront, and I consistently had this idea that I 
was either going to collect from someone here or have 
something happen over here and I was going to be able to 
make it right. I never told JoAnn Wilson that I had used 
her money. At the same time, I never told JoAnn Wilson 
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that she would never get her money, that her money 
somehow had vanished. I basically used the language to 
keep her in suspense about what was happening with her 
money. But, you know, I didn't send her any letters telling 
her that her money was something - somewhere else or 
even tell her. I mean -
Q. You didn't respond at all, did you, to several of 
her requests? 
A. Only when cornered did I respond to her in any 
way. 
Q. Why? 
A. Number One, I was embarrassed; number two, 
I was defenseless; number three, I didn't want to lie to her, 
I didn't want to tell her some blatant untruth. I had used 
her money. I knew what I had done was wrong. I felt 
badly about it. And I kept thinking that around the corner 
I'm going to be able to have this conversation with her, I'm 
going to be able to tell her that her money is right here. I 
remember ~ well, that's neither here nor there. As it turns 
out, I didn't have that time when I had that money. 
Q. I am sorry, I didn't understand that. You didn't -
A. As it turns out, the time didn't come when I had 
JoAnn Wilson's money available to repay her. I finally got 
it done, but there is no question that I did it after I was 
forced with the issue. And - and maybe the catalyst was 
that I finally found the strength tell my wife what I had 
done, and that then gave me the strength to do whatever 
it took to find the money to repay her. I mean, the loan 
that we made was an extraordinary loan. It was as if I had 
to borrowing capacity all during that time and just chose to 
ignore it. I went through someone who had been 
recommended to me to make it possible so I would have 
that money to repay her. 
Q. Doesn't just stop there; does it Pete? I am sure 
that Ms. Toomey is going to ask about your failure to 
respond to the Bar when asked for information regarding 
this, and I'm sure that Ms. Toomey is going to talk to you 
about the postponement of the time that the first complaint 
was filed, at least as it related to some of the other counts, 
and allowing you to deal with those before they decided 
how they were going to pursue it and your failure to 
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promptly respond to discovery and then after this Court 
entered an order granting Ms. Toomey attorney fees for 
the motion to compel that she had filed, your failure to 
timely pay those attorney fees. I mean, that - why have 
you persisted in your willingness to come forward and say, 
"I've done wrong and I will cooperate and do everything 
possible to make it right?" 
. . . A. No, I didn't respond because I - for the same 
reasons that I had difficulty talking with JoAnn Wilson. 
What are you supposed to say when someone tells you 
that you have improperly used someone else's money and 
you know that you have? What the Bar might have 
expected is some kind of letter articulating a defense. I 
didn't have a defense. I didn't have an explanation, really, 
and I certainly had no justification. I had done what JoAnn 
Wilson was alluding to in her complaint. I had taken her 
money and I hadn't given it back, or I had used her money 
and I hadn't ever given her a reasonable - or a time when 
she would expect to get it -get paid." 
As for the remorse expressed by Mr. Ennenga: 
"That being said, I can tell you unequivocally that as far as 
the incident with JoAnn Wilson's money is concerned, that 
was an aberration and will always be an aberration. I wish 
every day I could undo what I did. But you can't. I've 
done it. And now I have to figure out how to live with that. 
My choice has been to acknowledge that it was wrong, 
and determine that I will not ever make that kind of 
mistake again. That's all I can say about that issue. 
Q. And you feel that sincerely? 
A. I feel it sincerely. That I do - that I don't mistake 
a lack of disclosure or publication about my personal 
mistakes with - for a lack of remorse or guilt about those 
same mistakes. I have felt guilty about what I did with that 
money for years before I had to confront it with third 
persons, and I have felt additional guilt ever since about 
what the fact that - or what the publication of that fact has 
done to my family. And I will have to deal with that guilt 
forever, because it's not going to just go away. It's not just 
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going to somehow disappear. I am not going to make the 
same mistake again. 
Mr. Ennenga believes the trial court's conclusion that the mitigating factors 
outweigh the aggravating factors was correct and supported by the evidence or at 
the very least, not "clearly erroneous." "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence 
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 
Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice 
between them cannot be clearly erroneous." Windsor v. Hinckley Dodge Inc. 79 F.3d 
996, 1000 (UT. 10th Cir. 1996). 
ISSUE ON CROSS APPEAL 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING RESPONDENT'S EX 
POST FACTO CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT. 
The new Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions substantially altered the framework for rendering decisions in attorney 
discipline cases and transferred jurisdiction over formal bar complaints of lawyer 
misconduct from the Board of Bar Commissioners to the District Court. This is 
important since all of Mr. Ennenga's misconduct occurred during the time period that 
the prior procedure and case law for imposing attorney discipline was applicable. 
As previously stated, it was in In Re Babilis, supra, that this Court first 
considered the application of Rule 6 and the weighing of aggravating factors and 
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mitigating factors. For the first time, the Supreme Court announced that as a matter 
of future principle, the general rule would be that "intentional misappropriation of 
client funds will result in disbarment unless the lawyer can demonstrate truly 
compelling mitigating circumstances." 
Before Babilis, the last reported case under the old Rules was Matter of 
Cassitv. 875 P.2d 548 (Utah 1994). Cassitv also involved a lawyer's violation of 
Rules which under the new standards would have presumptively required 
disbarment. Instead, the Supreme Court issued a public reprimand and a one-year 
probation. In Babilis, the Supreme Court made no effort to distinguish its earlier 
holding in Cassitv and apparently relied exclusively on the adoption of the new 
Standards and Rules for creating its new presumptively appropriate standard. The 
application of this standard is inequitable to Mr. Ennenga since the enactment, and 
application of the new standard, all occurred after his misconduct. 
Babilis specifically talks about the benefits of a more clear test of conditions 
for disbarment, but does so prospectively, not retroactively. "Lawyers should be on 
notice that an intentional act of misappropriation of a client's funds is an act that 
merits disbarment." at 213. Since Babilis was decided after Mr. Ennenga's 
misconduct that "notice" could have no deterring impact. 
It is Mr. Ennenga's position, that prior to the announcement of Babilis, there 
were a number of cases of attorney misconduct that involved the misappropriation 
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of clients' funds or intentional misconduct equally egregious that did not result in 
disbarment. Prior to Babilis, there was no presumptive disbarment applicable for 
misuse of clients' funds. In light of the fact that Mr. Ennenga's misconduct occurred 
prior to the adoption of the new Rules and Standards, he should be entitled to the 
application of the Standards for Discipline that were actually being utilized during the 
period of time that his misconduct occurred, not something that was enacted and 
ruled upon subsequent to his misconduct. 
Over the past several years the Utah State Bar has developed the practice of 
publicly reporting all forms of attorney discipline in its Utah Bar Journal. These are 
reported in the section referred to as the "Discipline Corner". In reviewing the 
published material related to attorney discipline in Utah for the five year period 
immediately preceding the Babilis decision, there were 43 attorney suspensions 
ranging from as little as three months to as long as three years. For example, on 
December 30,1991, Elizabeth Joseph was suspended from the practice of law for 
a period of one year for having wrongfully commingled a $20,000.00 death 
settlement of her client with her personal funds and failing thereafter to promptly pay 
those funds to her client; on January 28, 1992, Jerry Thome was suspended for six 
months for accepting a $3,000.00 retainer and thereafter failing to provide 
meaningful services to his client; on March 24,1992, Joseph R. Fox was suspended 
for 15 months for accepting approximately 83 collection cases on behalf of his client 
for which he billed fees in the amount of $9,955.00 and of that amount, $8,203.75 
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were fees for work that had not been performed; on May 19,1992, John R. Bucher 
was suspended for a period of six months for a variety of misconduct which included 
improprieties involving in the use of his trust account; on October 14, 1992, Richard 
J. Culbertson was placed on suspension for one year after previously failing to 
comply with terms and conditions of probation which had been imposed earlier in 
connection with a private reprimand in connection with his having comingled client 
funds, failing to communicate with clients and writing checks on an account with 
insufficient funds; on November 3,1992, Harold R. Stevens was suspended for one 
year with two years of supervised probation for failing to file a responsive pleading 
to a complaint wherein $149,000.00 was allegedly owed to a lender thereby resulting 
in a default judgment against his client which could not ultimately be set aside 
because of Mr. Stevens' inaction; on February 11, 1993, George S. Clark was 
suspended for one year for failing to provide legal services to a client who had paid 
a retainer and in a second complaint, settled a personal injury case but thereafter 
failed to pay the existing medical bills as he had agreed to do causing his client to 
be exposed to $5,000.00 continuing medical obligations; on November 9, 1993, 
Donald E. Elkins was suspended for one year for falsely representing to his clients 
that he had filed a civil suit on their behalf and that a judgment had been entered in 
their favor when in fact, no suit had ever been filed. 
During this same time period, 83 attorneys received either an admonition or 
private reprimand. It should be noted that with the adoption of the new standards of 
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discipline, a private reprimand was eliminated and the only form of private discipline 
available to the Bar is an admonition. It is interesting to note however, the summary 
description of attorney misconduct which resulted in these private forms of discipline, 
for example: 
a. A conviction of attempting to distribute cocaine; 
b. Refusing to return clients' money after providing no meaningful services; 
c. Patronizing a prostitute; 
d. Failing to provide vital information to the Court which had been given 
to the lawyer from his client resulting in damage to the client; 
e. Lack of diligence in resolving disputes adversely affecting clients; 
f. Failing to cooperate with the Bar's investigation regarding clients' 
complaints of failing to provide meaningful services; 
g. Conflict of interests in representing different parties in substantially 
related proceedings; 
h. Borrowing a portion of settlement proceeds from a client in a personal 
injury case without advising the client of his right to have a disinterested attorney 
review the transaction and without obtaining the client's written consent to that 
transaction and thereafter failing to repay the loan to the client; (emphasis added) 
I. Physically assaulting the opposing party's attorney outside the 
courthouse; 
j . Using a trust account to conduct personal business transactions; and 
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k. Charging an excessive fee in a personal injury case where it was 
determined that the contingent fee agreement was inappropriate and the fee should 
be measured by other standards. 
During that same time period, there were 14 public reprimands. Some of the 
conduct involved for that sanction included: 
a. Drafting Wills for a client wherein the attorney and members of his 
family were included as beneficiaries in the decedent's estate and were not related 
by blood or marriage to the decedent; 
b. Representing individuals and corporate clients and at the same time 
representing an individual whose interests were adverse to the other clients. A 
specific finding of misconduct and conflict was determined by U.S. District Court 
Judge Sam; 
c. Unilaterally abrogating a fee agreement and after having previously 
forgiven a sizeable fee, and electing to apply the entire amount recovered on behalf 
of his clients towards a fee previously forgiven; and 
d. Settling a client's personal injury case and executing the settlement 
documents on behalf of a client without obtaining the client's approval. 
The four reported appellate decisions regarding attorney discipline in Utah 
immediately preceding Babilis include: 
Matter of Discipline of Schwenke, 849 P.2d 573 (Utah 1993). Here, the 
attorney was the subject of two complaints where he took money and failed to 
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provide meaningful services for which he got a one-year supervised probation for 
neglect. Thereafter, he failed to make required restitution and then filed bankruptcy 
on the obligation. A subsequent complaint was filed alleging the attorney initiated 
a bankruptcy for a client to prevent foreclosure on property that the attorney had 
purchased from the client. The Bar subsequently brought an Order to Show Cause 
for the attorney's failure to abide by the prior discipline and they recommended 
disbarment. The Supreme Court found that the Bar's service of the Order to Show 
Cause notice was deficient and that the attorney's subsequent misconduct was not 
sufficient grounds for disbarment. 
In a subsequent action against this same attorney involving a misappropriation 
of $100,000.00 in a client's personal injury case, the Supreme Court did affirm a 
recommendation of disbarment. See In Re Schwenke, 865 P.2d 1350 (Utah 1993). 
In the Matter of Complaint Against Smith, 872 P.2d 447 (Utah 1994), the 
Supreme Court held that disbarment was not mandatory where a conviction for a 
crime involving moral turpitude was involved. In this particular case, the attorney 
had forged his wife's signature on an Acceptance of Service and Waiver in a divorce 
action and recorded the false instruments with the court. The attorney then 
attempted to rectify the consequences of his actions and sought psychological 
counseling. The Supreme Court held that the misconduct warranted a one-year 
suspension. 
And finally, as previously referenced, the case of Matter of Cassitv, 875 P.2d 
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548 (Utah 1994). Mr. Cassity failed to remit to his client a rightful portion of 
settlement proceeds. He also conspired to commit a fraud on the bankruptcy court. 
The hearing panel concluded that Cassity had violated Rule 8.4(c) by engaging in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, conduct which 
under the current rules would be subject to the presumptive imposition of disbarment 
as the appropriate level of discipline. As aggravating factors, the panel considered 
Cassity's substantial experience in the practice of law and his refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. Initially, the panel recommended 
that Cassity be publicly reprimanded and placed on probation for six months. 
However, the board subsequently modified that recommendation and requested a 
one-year suspension. 
In reviewing the recommended punishment, the Supreme Court pointed out 
that conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation are elements 
for the sanction of disbarment, as well as the elements for reprimand. Under 
disbarment, the dishonesty must "seriously adversely reflect on the lawyer's fitness 
to practice law" while under the standards for reprimand, the dishonesty is only of 
a nature that it "adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law". They held 
that the appropriate sanction would be a public reprimand and a one-year probation. 
It is the Cassity case that most closely resembles Mr. Ennenga's facts. If the Cassity 
standard for disbarment were utilized in Mr. Ennenga's case, it is doubtful the Bar 
would be pursuing this appeal. Discipline actually being imposed contemporaneous 
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with Mr. Ennenga's misconduct would be similar or less serious than that already 
imposed on Mr. Ennenga. By utilizing post 1993 disciplinary standards, the Bar is 
violating his constitutional right to be protected against ex post facto application of 
the new Rules. 
In the criminal context, it has been held that when the legislature alters the 
penalty for a crime after a defendant has allegedly committed the crime but before 
sentencing, the new statute - - the one in effect at the time of sentencing - - is 
applied so long as it does not raise a Constitutional question of being an ex post 
facto law by reason of increasing the punishment. Belt v. Turner 483 P.2d 425, 425-
426 (Utah 1971). 
If a statutory amendment increases the punishment, the sentence should be 
determined according to the law in effect on the date the crime was committed. 
Smith v. Cook 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990). These rules of law were reaffirmed 
in the recent case of State v. Dominauez 992 P.2d 995 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
It is anticipated that the Office of Professional Conduct will claim that the 
revised disciplinary rules and disciplinary adjudications are civil proceedings and not 
subject to principles of criminal law. Mr. Ennenga respectfully disagrees. 
The issue of whether a civil penalty is subject to constitutional arguments 
normally reserved for criminal offenses was discussed in the recent Utah Supreme 
Court certiorari review of State v. Davis 972 P.2d 388 (Utah 1998). Davis held that 
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in rem property forfeitures were remedial civil sanctions, and at least in the facts of 
that case, was not a aiminal punishment so as to subject it to a constitutional claim 
of double jeopardy. Davis, however, discussed at length United State Supreme 
Court cases which addressed the issue as to whether a civil penalty is so punitive 
in either purpose or effect so as to constitute a criminal penalty and thereby make 
it subject to constitutional arguments typically reserved for the realm of criminal law. 
Davis cited with approval United States v. Ward 448 US 242 (1980) and Kennedy 
v. Mendoza-Martinez 372 US 144 (1963). Ward relied upon Mendoza-Martinez 
which set out a non-exclusive list of criteria for determining whether a nominally civil 
statute actually prescribed a criminal penalty. That test was: 
"Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it 
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will 
promote the traditional aims of punishment - - retribution and 
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, 
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected 
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excess in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned." 
Davis at 390. 
Evaluating each of these criteria, it is submitted that Mr. Ennenga's case 
meets these tests. 
1. Attorney discipline has historically been regarded by the public and the 
legal profession as punishment, at least when sanctions of suspension or disbarment 
are imposed. 
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2. The Court has found that Mr. Ennenga's misconduct which OPC claims 
justifies disbarment involved scienter. 
3. To disbar Mr. Ennenga will promote the traditional aims of punishment -
retribution and deterrence. 
4. Mr. Ennenga's behavior has been characterized by OPC as a crime and 
indeed this Court has concluded as a matter of law that Mr. Ennenga violated Rule 
8.4(b) "commit a criminal act' and (c) "engage in conduct involving dishonesty". 
The next criteria, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable, was addressed in Babilis. Admittedly, in Babilis, the 
Supreme Court said that a restriction on, or withdrawal of, the right to practice law 
as a sanction for violation of professional ethical standards is remedial in nature and 
that attorney discipline was therefore neither punitive nor a criminal penalty. 
That statement in Babilis was conclusionary in nature, made before the 
decision of State v. Davis and did not involve the analysis or tests adopted by the 
United State Supreme Court in Mendoza-Martinez. Moreover, Babilis did not 
address the disparity in punishment for similar misconduct prior to the adoption of 
the 1993 Standards and the new Standard adopted by Babilis in imposing attorney 
discipline. 
In a purely civil context, §68-3-3, Utah Code Annotated provides that "No part 
of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." While the 
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adoption of the new standards of discipline was not a legislative act, the same 
principle of non-retroactive application should apply. 
CONCLUSION 
Since all of Mr. Ennenga's misconduct occurred prior to the adoption of the 
current Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline, the trial court should have applied 
the earlier rules and case law interpreting those rules. Had that occurred, the level 
of discipline imposed on Mr. Ennenga would likely have been less severe. Failure 
to apply the earlier rules, violates Mr. Ennenga's ex post facto protections and 
retroactively imposes standards that did not specifically provide for retroactive 
application when they were adopted. 
To the extent that the Court relied on the new Rules, each factor was properly 
evaluated and the mitigating factors justified departure from presumptive disbarment. 
Respectfully submitted this \^ 1 a^-dav^of November, 2000. 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Respondent/ 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I am employed by Brian R. Florence, attorney for 
respondent/appellee/cross-appellant, that I served the attached Reply and Cross 
Appeal Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant herein, upon the parties by placing two true 
and correct copies thereof in an envelope and causing the same to be mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid, on the \[p day of November, 2000, to the following: 
Kate A. Toomey 
Attorney for Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City UT 84111-3834 
Jo/\f\n T. Florence, Legal Assistant 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law of trial 
held January 18, 2000. 
2. Memorandum Decision re entered April 3, 2000 re: sanctions hearing 
held March 28, 2000. 
3. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
4. Order of Suspension. 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UT; 
In the Matter of the Discipline 
of: 
PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 970905496 
At the conclusion of trial on January 11, 2000, the Court took 
this matter under advisement and now issues its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The respondent is an attorney licensed to practice law in 
the state of Utah since 1970. 
2. In approximately the spring of 1991 JoAnn Wilson retained 
the respondent to collect various amounts owed her, including a sum 
in the approximate amount of $18,000 owed to her business by Thomas 
E. Soderberg. 
3. Respondent collected $18,000 from Thomas E. Soderberg on 
or about May 21, 1992. 
4. On approximately May 26, 1992, Wilson requested that 
Ennenga hold the $18,000 in an interest-bearing escrow account. 
5. Respondent never deposited said money in any trust or 
escrow account, but in October of 1992 deposited a portion of 
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Wilson's money into his personal checking account, retaining the 
balance in the form of a cashier's check. 
6. Respondent spent all of Wilson's money for personal 
purposes. 
7. In April, 1993, Wilson's accountant requested an 
accounting of the money from respondent, and respondent failed to 
provide it. 
8. Wilson made several attempts to contact respondent 
regarding her money and respondent either failed to respond or 
promised payment, which he failed to do. 
9. Wilson filed an informal Complaint against respondent 
with the OPC on May 30, 1996. 
10. Respondent did not pay Wilson her money until June of 
1997. 
11. Respondent used his position as Wilson's attorney and 
fiduciary to obtain possession of Wilson's money. 
12. Respondent breached his fiduciary duty and converted 
Wilson's funds for his own use without her permission or knowledge. 
13. Taner Yarbil retained respondent on June 3, 1993 on a 
contingency fee basis to represent him in a civil action. 
14. Respondent requested a retainer of $2,250 of which Yarbil 
paid respondent $750. 
O l^ v 
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15. Respondent filed a Complaint on Yarbil's behalf and 
served one of two defendants in said case, but stopped any actions 
to prosecute said case and failed to inform Yarbil that he was no 
longer going to pursue the matter. 
16. Yarbil filed an informal Complaint with the OPC on April 
15 1995. 
17. Beginning in the late 1970's respondent represented 
Rodney Glover in various matters, including part of a divorce 
proceeding. 
18. Respondent's representation of Glover enabled him to 
learn certain details regarding Glover's financial condition. 
19. On January 29, 1987 respondent obtained from Glover 
$7,500 in the form of a loan. 
20. Glover received only a form Promissory Note signed by 
Ennenga, there was no security for the Note, and Ennenga did not 
provide Glover any information regarding Ennenga's ability to repay 
the Note. 
21. Ennenga did not advise Glover to consult with independent 
counsel regarding the transaction, and Glover did not consent in 
writing to the loan arrangement with Ennenga. 
22. Ennenga failed to timely repay the loan. 
^u 
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23. Glover filed suit against Ennenga seeking payment, and 
obtained a Default Judgment against him on March 7, 1989, which 
Ennenga did not pay. 
24. In 1992 Glover retained the services of Raymond Farrell 
to attempt to collect the money on the Note. 
25. The attorney who represented Glover in the lawsuit in 
which the Judgment was obtained on March 7, 1989 explained to 
Glover that Ennenga had violated certain Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
26. Glover filed an informal Complaint with the OPC on 
February 16, 1993. 
27. The OPC sent Ennenga requests for information in response 
to Wilson's Complaint, Yarbil's Complaint and Glover's Complaint. 
Ennenga failed to timely respond to any requests for information 
from the OPC. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has already entered Summary Judgment against 
the defendant on Counts 8 and 13 of the First Amended Complaint and 
concludes that respondent violated Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, and in said Summary Judgment the Court finds 
that respondent violated Rules 1.15, 8.4(b)(c), 1.4 and 8.1 with 
respect to the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
•*rk 
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2. The Court finds that the statute of limitations bars the 
OPC Complaint against Ennenga on the Glover matter. 
Counsel are to contact the Court and arrange a sanctions 
hearing pursuant to Rule 11(f) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability. 
Dated this (o day of January, 2000. 
%T&fsKl 
STEPHEN L. HENRIO 
DISTRICT COURT JUi 
*
?
*
$!
*S3!«?S?:S<< 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this day of 
January, 2000: 
Kate A. Toomey 
Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Respondent 
5790 Harrison Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAI/DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline 
of: 
PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 970905496 
This matter was tried on January 11, 2000, after which the 
Court took the matter under advisement. Prior to trial, Summary 
Judgment had been entered against respondent on Counts 8 and 13 of 
the First Amended Complaint, concluding that respondent had 
violated Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. On 
January 18, 2000, the Court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, concluding that the respondent violated Rule 
1.15, Safekeeping Property; 8.4(b), Committing a Criminal Act that 
Reflects Adversely on the Lawyerfs Honesty; 8.4(c), Engaging in 
Conduct Involving Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit or Misrepresentation; 
1.4, Failing to Communicate with Client; and 8.1, additional 
conclusions of respondents Failure to Provide Information to the 
Office of Professional Conduct. Following the Findings and 
Conclusions and after a waiver with respect to the time for a 
sanctions hearing, a hearing was held on March 28, 2000 regarding 
the issue of sanctions. The Court took the matter under advisement 
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and now issues this Memorandum Decision with respect to said 
sanctions. 
Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions, generally the following factors should be considered: 
a. The duty violated; 
b. The lawyerfs mental state; 
c. The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 
misconduct; and 
d. The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
The specific duties violated by Mr. Ennenga with respect to 
8.1 were in three separate instances he failed to provide 
information to the OPC through the normal discovery process in this 
case. The duty that he violated with respect to Rule 1.4 was in 
failing to communicate with a client named Yarbil. After taking a 
partial retainer of $750 and filing a Complaint, Mr. Ennenga failed 
to continue to work on the matter and failed to inform Mr. Yarbil 
of that fact. With respect to Rules 1.15, 8.4(b) and 8.4(c), Mr. 
Ennenga collected the sum of $18,000 for his client, Ms. Wilson, in 
May of 1992. Ms. Wilson requested that Mr. Ennenga hold it in his 
interest-bearing trust account because she was going through 
several important changes in her life and felt that the money would 
be better kept by her attorney. Mr. Ennenga never deposited the 
money into a trust account, but instead deposited part in his 
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personal checking account and had part converted into a cashierfs 
check, all of which he took and used for himself. At least part of 
the money was used to prevent Mr. Ennenga's family home from being 
foreclosed for failure to make mortgage payments. 
The reason that Mr. Ennenga misappropriated Ms. Wilson's money 
was that he had a history of poor business practices in connection 
with his law practice which resulted in his personal financial 
situation being such that he could not make his mortgage payments 
when due. This objective financial situation was coupled with Mr. 
Ennenga's subjective inability to inform his wife and children that 
he was not meeting his financial obligations. Mr. Ennenga knew 
that Ms. Wilson was not going to require immediate payment of her 
funds to her, and he stalled her when she started requesting the 
funds by avoiding discussion of the fund's whereabouts or the 
specific time that he would remit them to her. Mr. Ennenga 
testified that he didn't want to lie to Ms. Wilson, but he didn't 
want to admit that he had taken the funds and no longer had them 
either. He further testified that he had many thousands of dollars 
outstanding in the form of accounts receivable and from the time 
that he took the $18,000 he believed he would be able to replace it 
with interest and pay Ms. Wilson her funds when she required them. 
Of course, this was not the case and he only repaid her in 1997 
after her informal complaint against him was filed in 1996 and she 
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had also retained an attorney to take action against Mr. Ennenga 
for the money. 
Mr. Yarbil did not testify and no evidence was presented to 
show that he suffered an injury as a result of Mr. Ennengafs 
misconduct. Mr. Ennenga paid Ms. Wilson the sum of $30,000 in 1997 
covering her principal, plus interest and attorneyfs fees, and when 
she testified, she did not claim any further injury. 
Rule 4 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states 
that absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon 
application of the factors set forth above from Rule 3, that 
sanctions are generally appropriate as follows: when a lawyer 
engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), 
(e) or (f), disbarment is the presumptive sanction. Mr. Ennenga's 
misappropriation of Ms. Wilsonfs funds clearly falls into Rule 
8.4(a) . He acted with the intent to benefit himself. Said conduct 
also falls within Rule 4.2(b), because the misappropriation of 
funds was serious criminal conduct and involved misrepresentation 
to Ms. Wilson and misappropriation of her funds. The other 
violations fall either under Rule 4.3 or 4.4. Mr. Ennenga 
knowingly engaged in the misconduct and caused potential injury to 
the legal system, and interfered with the pending disciplinary 
action against him. 
* & < • * 
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Unbeknownst to the OPC, Mr. Ennenga had received two prior 
reprimands which he acknowledged at trial. Said reprimands were 
for failure to do timely filings in the late 1980fs that did not 
involve money. 
The presumptive sanction under Rule 4.2 for respondents 
misappropriation of Ms. Wilson's money is disbarment. 
The next step in the analysis of the appropriate sanction is 
consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set 
forth in Rule 6. In In re: Babilis, 951 P.2d 215, the Supreme 
Court explained that, "To justify departure from the presumptive 
level of discipline set forth in the standards the aggravating and 
mitigating factors must be significant.11 
Rule 6.2 provides that aggravating circumstances may include: 
(a) Prior record of discipline. There was prior discipline, 
but not of the same nature as the Wilson misconduct. 
(b) Dishonest or selfish motive. Mr. Ennengafs act was to 
benefit himself and his family. 
(c) A pattern of misconduct. The Court does not find a 
pattern of misconduct in this matter, excepting his reluctance to 
participate in the disciplinary process against him. 
(d) Multiple offenses. While consideration of the rules 
violated would seem to indicate multiple offenses, it is the trial 
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court1s perspective that there were minor offenses and one stand-
alone serious offense, namely, the Wilson matter. 
(e) Obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by 
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the 
disciplinary authority. Mr. Ennenga admits this. 
(f) Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other 
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process. This has 
apparently not occurred. 
(g) Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the 
misconduct involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary 
authority. Mr. Ennenga has admitted the wrongful nature of the 
misconduct, has explained his involvement completely, and expresses 
sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the misconduct took 
place. He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until 
shortly before the trial. 
(h) Vulnerability of victim. Neither Mr. Yarbil nor Ms. 
Wilson were particularly vulnerable. Mr. Wilson, in fact, made the 
misconduct too easy. 
(i) Substantial experience in the practice of law. Mr. 
Ennenga has practiced law for some 30 years, but it was only 21 
years to the date of the misappropriation of funds. 
(j) Lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to 
rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga 
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has made full restitution, but did not do so until he was under 
duress. 
(k) Illegal conduct, including the use of controlled 
substances. The only illegal conduct that occurred here was the 
misappropriation of funds. 
The mitigating circumstances set forth in Rule 6.3 are as 
follows: 
(a) Absence of a prior record of discipline. As stated 
above, there is a prior record of discipline, but less significant 
than 8.4 and not of the same sort of misconduct. 
(b) Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. Not the case 
here. 
(c) Personal or emotional problems. Mr. Ennenga was 
suffering personal and emotional problems as a result of his 
inability to meet his regular financial obligations. 
(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to 
rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennengafs 
effort was not particularly timely, but he did completely rectify 
the consequences to Ms. Wilson. 
(e) Full and free disclosure to the client or the 
disciplinary authority prior to the discovery of any misconduct, or 
cooperative attitude toward proceedings. This did not occur. 
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(f) Inexperience in the practice of the law. Not applicable. 
(g) Good character or reputation. Two attorneys in good 
standing and two clients of Mr. Ennenga's testified that they 
believed despite the facts of the instant case, that Mr. Ennenga 
was a fine attorney with an outstanding reputation for honesty. 
(h) Physical disability. Not applicable. 
(i) Mental disability or impairment. Not applicable. 
(j) Unreasonable delay in the disciplinary proceedings 
provided that the respondent did not substantially contribute to 
the delay and provided further that the respondent has demonstrated 
prejudice resulting from the delay. There was a significant delay 
in this matter. While Ms. Wilson did not file her complaint 
against the respondent until 1996, other complaints with respect to 
other matters referred to above were filed in 1993. The OPC has 
been conducting an investigation into this matter since 1993, and 
only filed its Complaint in August of 1997, and its First Amended 
Complaint in September of 1997. Mr. Ennenga certainly didn't 
facilitate moving the case forward on a faster track in his refusal 
to provide information to the Bar through the discovery process, 
but the delay is attributable as much or more to the OPC as it is 
to Mr. Ennenga. Mr. Ennenga has not demonstrated prejudice 
resulting from the delay. 
3iv 
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(k) Interim reform. Mr. Ennenga has not had any valid 
complaints filed against him regarding misconduct after 1992. 
(1) Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. The Court is 
aware of no other penalties or sanctions Mr. Ennenga has suffered. 
(m) Remorse. As stated above, Mr. Ennenga is very remorseful 
and has been since the 1992 misconduct. 
(n) Remoteness of prior offenses. Prior offenses are not 
particularly significant, but are also not particularly remote in 
time. 
The mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances. In considering appropriate sanctions, the Court ha 
reviewed the Tanner. 346 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 960 P. 2d 399 (1998, 
Utah Lexis 40); Stubbs, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 974 P.2d 296 (1999, 
Utah Lexis 20); Babilis, 332 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 951 P.2d 207 (1997, 
Utah Lexis 108); and Ince, 340 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 957 P.2d 1233 
(1998, Utah Lexis 17), matters, wherein trial courts recommended 
sanctions less than disbarment and the Supreme Court held that 
disbarment was appropriate. Weighing the misconduct of Mr. Ennenga 
against the misconduct of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a 
significant difference in the seriousness of the conduct, both as 
to the number of incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the 
time elapsed between misconduct and sanction. 
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Mr. Ennenga makes an ex post facto argument analogizing to 
criminal punishment. The Court finds that is contrary to case law 
and not persuasive. These cases involved prolonged activities and 
repeated instances of serious misconduct. 
Mr. Ennenga should be suspended from the practice of law f**> 
a period of six months, and when he is readmitted to practice for 
a period not less than three years, he should have the supervision 
of an experienced attorney, and he should also participate in 
psychological or psychiatric counseling prior to practicing law 
again. 
Dated this J^  day of April, 2000. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999 
Respondent. 
i FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
| CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 970905496 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This matter was tried on January 11, 2000, after which the Court took the matter 
under advisement. Prior to trial, Summary Judgment had been entered against 
respondent on Counts 8 and 13 of the First Amended Complaint, concluding that 
respondent had violated Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. On January 
18, 2000, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, concluding that 
the respondent violated Rule 1.15, Safekeeping Property; 8.4(b), Committing a Criminal 
Act that Reflects Adversely on the Lawyer's Honesty; 8.4(c), Engaging in Conduct 
Involving Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit or Misrepresentation; 1.4, Failing to Communicate 
with Client; and 8.1, additional conclusions of respondent's Failure to Provide 
Information to the Office of Professional Conduct. Following the Findings and 
Conclusions and after a waiver with respect to the time for a sanctions hearing, a 
hearing was held on March 28, 2000 regarding the issue of sanctions. The Court took 
the matter under advisement and hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, generally 
the following factors should be considered: 
a. The duty violated; 
b. The lawyer's mental state; 
c. The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and 
d. The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
The specific duties violated by Mr. Ennenga with respect to 8.1 were in three 
separate instances he failed to provide information to the OPC through the normal 
discovery process in this case. The duty that he violated with respect to Rule 1.4 was in 
failing to communicate with a client named Yarbil. After taking a partial retainer of $750 
and filing a Complaint, Mr. Ennenga failed to continue to work on the matter and failed 
to inform Mr. Yarbil of that fact. With respect to Rules 1.15, 8.4(b) and 8.4(c), Mr. 
Ennenga collected the sum of $18,000 for his client, Ms. Wilson, in May of 1992. Ms. 
Wilson requested that Mr. Ennenga hold it in his interest-bearing trust account because 
she was going through several important changes in her life and felt that the money 
would be better kept by her attorney. Mr. Ennenga never deposited the money into a 
trust account, but instead deposited part in his personal checking account and had part 
converted into a cashier's check, all of which he took and used for himself. At least part 
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of the money was used to prevent Mr. Ennenga's family home from being foreclosed for 
failure to make mortgage payments. 
The reason that Mr. Ennenga misappropriated Ms. Wilson's money was that he 
had a history of poor business practices in connection with his law practice which 
resulted in his personal financial situation being such that he could not make his 
mortgage payments when due. This objective financial situation was coupled with Mr. 
Ennenga's subjective inability to inform his wife and children that he was not meeting 
his financial obligations. Mr. Ennenga knew that Ms. Wilson was not going to require 
immediate payment of her funds to her, and he stalled her when she started requesting 
the funds by avoiding discussion of the funds' whereabouts or the specific time that he 
would remit them to her. Mr. Ennenga testified that he didn't want to lie to Ms. Wilson, 
but he didn't want to admit that he had taken the funds and no longer had them either. 
He further testified that he had many thousands of dollars outstanding in the form of 
accounts receivable and from the time that he took the $18,000 he believed he would 
be able to replace it with interest and pay Ms. Wilson her funds when she required 
them. Of course, this was not the case and he only repaid her in 1997 after her informal 
complaint against him was filed in 1996 and she had also retained an attorney to take 
action against Mr. Ennenga for the money. 
Mr. Yarbil did not testify and no evidence was presented to show that he suffered 
an injury as a result of Mr. Ennenga's misconduct. Mr. Ennenga paid Ms. Wilson the 
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sum of $30,000 in 1997 covering her principal, plus interest and attorney's fees, and 
when she testified, she did not claim any further injury. 
Rule 4 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states that absent 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set forth above 
from Rule 3, that sanctions are generally appropriate as follows: when a lawyer 
engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e) or (f), disbarment 
is the presumptive sanction. Mr. Ennenga's misappropriation of Ms. Wilson's funds 
clearly falls into Rule 8.4(a). He acted with the intent to benefit himself. Said conduct 
also falls within Rule 4.2(b), because the misappropriation of funds was serious criminal 
conduct and involved misrepresentation to Ms. Wilson and misappropriation of her 
funds. The other violations fall either under Rule 4.3 or 4.4. Mr. Ennenga knowingly 
engaged in the misconduct and caused potential injury to the legal system, and 
interfered with the pending disciplinary action against him. 
Unbeknownst to the OPC, Mr. Ennenga had received two prior reprimands which 
he acknowledged at trial. Said reprimands were for failure to do timely filings in the late 
1980's that did not involve money. 
The presumptive sanction under Rule 4.2 for respondent's misappropriation of 
Ms. Wilson's money is disbarment. 
The next step in the analysis of the appropriate sanction is consideration of the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in Rule 6. In In re: Babilis, 951 P.2d 
215, the Supreme Court explained that, "To justify departure from the presumptive level 
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of discipline set forth in the standards the aggravating and mitigating factors must be 
significant." 
Rule 6.2 provides that aggravating circumstances may include: 
(a) Prior record of discipline. There was prior discipline, but not of the same 
nature as the Wilson misconduct. 
(b) Dishonest or selfish motive. Mr. Ennenga's act was to benefit himself and 
his family. 
(c) A pattern of misconduct. The Court does not find a pattern of misconduct in 
this matter, excepting his reluctance to participate in the disciplinary process against 
him. 
(d) Multiple offenses. While consideration of the rules violated would seem to 
indicate multiple offenses, it is the trial court's perspective that there were minor 
offenses and one stand-alone serious offense, namely, the Wilson matter. 
(e) Obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply 
with the rules or orders of the disciplinary authority. Mr. Ennenga admits this. 
(f) Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary process. This has apparently not occurred. 
(g) Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, 
either to the client or to the disciplinary authority. Mr. Ennenga has admitted the 
wrongful nature of the misconduct, has explained his involvement completely, and 
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expresses sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the misconduct took place. 
He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until shortly before the trial. 
(h) Vulnerability of victim. Neither Mr. Yarbil nor Ms. Wilson were particularly 
vulnerable. Ms. Wilson, in fact, made the misconduct too easy. 
(i) Substantial experience in the practice of law. Mr. Ennenga has practiced 
law for some 30 years, but it was only 21 years to the date of the misappropriation of 
funds. 
(j) Lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences 
of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga has made full restitution, but did not do so 
until he was under duress. 
(k) Illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. The only 
illegal conduct that occurred here was the misappropriation of funds. 
The mitigating circumstances set forth in Rule 6.3 are as follows: 
(a) Absence of a prior record of discipline. As stated above, there is a prior 
record of discipline, but less significant that 8.4 and not of the same sort of misconduct. 
(b) Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. Not the case here. 
(c) Personal or emotional problems. Mr. Ennenga was suffering personal and 
emotional problems as a result of his inability to meet his regular financial obligations. 
(d) Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences 
of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga's effort was not particularly timely, but he did 
completely rectify the consequences to Ms. Wilson. 
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(e) Full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the 
discovery of any misconduct, or cooperative attitude toward proceedings. This did not 
occur. 
(f) Inexperience in the practice of the law. Not applicable. 
(g) Good character or reputation. Two attorneys in good standing and two 
clients of Mr. Ennenga's testified that they believed despite the facts of the instant case, 
that Mr. Ennenga was a fine attorney with an outstanding reputation for honesty. 
(h) Physical disability. Not applicable. 
(i) Mental disability or impairment. Not applicable. 
(j) Unreasonable delay in the disciplinary proceedings provided that the 
respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that the 
respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay. There was a 
significant delay in this matter. While Ms. Wilson did not file her complaint against the 
respondent until 1996, other complaints with respect to other matters referred to above 
were filed in 1993. The OPC has been conducting an investigation into this matter 
since 1993, and only filed its Complaint in August of 1997, and its First Amended 
Complaint in September of 1997. Mr. Ennenga certainly didn't facilitate moving the 
case forward on a faster track in his refusal to provide information to the Bar through the 
discovery process, but the delay is attributable as much or more to the OPC as it is to 
Mr. Ennenga. Mr. Ennenga has not demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay. 
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(k) Interim reform. Mr. Ennenga has not had any valid complaints filed 
against him regarding misconduct after 1992. 
(I) Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. The Court is aware of no other 
penalties or sanctions Mr. Ennenga has suffered. 
(m) Remorse. As stated above, Mr. Ennenga is very remorseful and has been 
since the 1992 misconduct. 
(n) Remoteness of prior offenses. Prior offenses are not particularly 
significant, but are also not particularly remote in time. 
The mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances. In 
considering appropriate sanctions, the Court has reviewed the Tanner, 346 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 20, 960 P.2d 399 (1998, Utah Lexis 40); Stubbs, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 974 P.2d 
296 (1999, Utah Lexis 20); Babilis. 332 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 951 P.2d 207 (1997, Utah 
Lexis 108); and Ince, 340 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 957 P.2d 1233 (1998, Utah Lexis 17), 
matters, wherein trial courts recommended sanctions less than disbarment and the 
Supreme Court held that disbarment was appropriate. Weighing the misconduct of Mr. 
Ennenga against the misconduct of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a 
significant difference in the seriousness of the conduct, both as to the number of 
incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the time elapsed between misconduct and 
sanction. 
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Mr. Ennenga makes an ex post facto argument analogizing to criminal 
punishment. The Court finds that is contrary to case law and not persuasive. These 
cases involved prolonged activities and repeated instances of serious misconduct. 
Mr. Ennenga should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six 
months, and when he is readmitted to practice for a period not less than three years, he 
should have the supervision of an experienced attorney, and he should also participate 
in psychological or psychiatric counseling prior to practicing law again. 
DATED this [ _ day of £pril,'2000. 
BY THE COURT: ^ c = r - ^ 
''ui. ... 
The Honorable Stephen t^v^Mocl 
District Court Judge \ ^••..# ~~.. 
Brian R. Florence 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on April ^ ) , 2000, I caused to be mailed via United States 
first-class mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to: 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Respondent 
5790 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
JM C LtdjvMy 
z:\ennenga peter\formal\plead\fmdings of fact doc 
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Tab 4 
Kate A. Toomey, #6446 
Assistant Counsel 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)531-9110 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999 
Respondent. 
ORDER: SUSPENSION 
I Civil No. 970905496 
i Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
The Court, having reviewed all pleadings and papers filed in this matter, having 
conducted a sanctions hearing on March 28, 2000 for the purpose of receiving 
testimony and exhibits, having heard the argument of counsel, having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and otherwise being fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, Peter M. Ennenga, is suspended 
rom the practice of law for a period of six months. 
It is further ordered that when Mr. Ennenga is readmitted to practice, for a period 
not less than three years he shall have the supervision of an experienced attorney. 
It is further ordered that Mr. Ennenga shall participate in psychological or 
psychiatric counseling prior to practicing law again. 
DATED this (_ day of ^pril/2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable Stephen L. HejfcQ6>Ui 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Brian R. Florence 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on April 2$, 2000, I caused to be mailed via United States 
first-class mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER: 
SUSPENSION to: 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Respondent 
5790 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
r, LfrifyuL \UUWL; 
z:\ennengapeter\formal\pIead\order.doc 
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